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PART C: FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 
INTRODUCTION 
BY GARRETT BIRKHOFF, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
Part C of these Proceedings presents three divergent views 
about the present status of the foundations of mathematics, held 
by leading authorities on the subject. To appreciate these views, 
one needs some historical background, which the next few paragraphs 
will try to give. 
During the century preceding World War I, most mathematicians 
had a deep faith in the essential integrity of mathematics; see 
for example Hilbert's historical remarks reproduced in van 
Heijenoort [Cll, p. 3751. The developments discussed in Part B 
took place in this atmosphere of faith. The psychological origins 
of the disagreements voiced in Part C can be traced back to an 
essential divergence of attitudes towards mathematics among 
mathematicians already observed in 1893 by Felix Klein, who 
wrote [C18]: 
Among mathematicians in general, three main 
categories may be distinguished; and perhaps the 
names logicians, formalists, and intuitionists may 
serve to categorize them. (1) The word logician is 
here used, of course, without reference to the math- 
ematical logic of Boole, Peirce, etc.; it is only 
intended to indicate that the main strength of the 
men belonging to this class lies in their logical 
and critical power, in their ability to give strict 
definitions, and to derive rigid deductions there- 
from. The great and wholesome influence exerted in 
Germany by Weierstrass in this direction is well 
known. (2) The formalists among the mathematicians 
excel mainly in the skilful formal treatment of a 
given question, in devising for it an "algorithm." 
Gordan, or let us say Cayley and Sylvester, must be 
ranged in this group. (3) To the intuitionists, 
finally, belong those who lay particular stress on 
geometrical intuition (Anschauung), not in pure 
geometry only, but in all branches of mathematics. 
What Benjamin Peirce has called "geometrizing a 
mathematical question" seems to express the same 
idea. Lord Kelvin and von Staudt may be mentioned 
as types of this category. 
Very similar distinctions were made by PoincarQ in his address 
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at the 1900 International Congress. 
In the 1920’s, this divergence of attitudes came to a head 
in a celebrated debate between the “intuitionists”, most notably 
Brouwer and Weyl, who challenged the non-constructive methods of 
proof used by Weierstrass and Cantor, and the “formalists” led 
by Hilbert, who believed that all proofs could be formalized by 
extending the ideas of Peano, Frege, Russell, and Whitehead. 
Though they disagreed about many things, both formalists and 
intuitionists still believed that the “right” foundations would 
eventually be found for all of mathematics. Thus as late as 1927, 
Hilbert still hoped to force the formalists to accept his “fund- 
amental insights” [Cll, pp, 490-21. 
But after Gt5del shattered the formalists’ dream in 1930, by 
proving the undecidability of Principia Mathematics and related 
systems, an era of heterodoxy and skepticism about the foundations 
of mathematics began. Thus today many mathematicians feel free 
to assume the Continuun Hypothesis or not, depending on what they 
wish to prove, and likewise for the Axiom of Choice and Souslin’s 
Hypothesis [a]. Even more important, they delight in showing that 
some questions are “undecidable”: one cannot tell whether the 
answer is yes or no. 
During the past twenty years, significant contributions to 
the foundations of mathematics have been made by two opposing 
schools. One, led by Abraham Robinson, claims Leibnizian ante- 
cedants for a “non-standard analysis” stemming from the “model 
theory” of Tarski [b]. The other (smaller) school, led by Errett 
Bishop, attempts to reinterpret Brouwer’s “intuitionism” in terms 
of conce 
book [Cl P 
ts of “constructive analysis” explained in Bishop’s 
. 
Unfortunately Robinson, whom we had hoped to have as a speaker, 
died in December 1973. However, Errett Bishop was able to attend, 
and his paper contains a plausible proposal for achieving a 
compromise. It also argues eloquently that there is a real crisis 
in mathematics stemming from its interpretation as a meaningless 
exercise in pure logic. His talk is supplemented in these 
Proceedings by supportive comments by G. Stolzenberg and N. Kopell. 
These comments were invited to fill the vacuum created by the 
absence of positive reactions to Bishop’s views from our other 
participants. 
In commenting on Bishop's paper, Gerald Sacks states that he 
is unimpressed by talk of a “crisis”, and skeptical about the 
reality of “paradoxes”. He argues that the “crisis” is unreal, 
because mathematicians agree on all substantive questions as to 
what has been proved and what has not. Spirited discussions 
ensued after both talks, Dreben (who was chairman) and the 
majority of the audience agreeing with the general position of 
Sacks. 
A third view towards foundational questions, less complacent 
than that of Sacks but more eclectic than that of Bishop, is 
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presented in the final paper by Hilary Putnam. This paper stresses 
the need for departing from the canons of pure mathematics when 
applying mathematical methods to physics. It takes a humanistic 
view toward foundations, in sympathy with Weyl's view that "Not 
as an isolated technical accomplishment, but only as part of 
human existence in its totality can [mathematizing] find its 
justification" [cl. 
NOTES 
a. There are of course many statements equivalent to the 
Axiom of Choice (see for example G. Birkhoff, Lattice Theory, 
3d ed., Chap. VIII) and others equivalent to the Continuum 
Hypothesis (see W. Sierpinski, L'HypothBse du Continu, Warsaw, 
1934.) Most mathematicians find the Axiom of Choice indispensible. 
b. The articles by Vaught and C.C. Chang in [Cl33 give an 
excellent historical review of model theory. For Robinson's 
use of it, see [C29]; also the Preface of W.A.J. Luxemburg (ed.), 
Applications of Model Theory to Algebra, Analysis and Probability, 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969, and A. Nerode in pp. 283-90 
of "Algebra and Logic", J.N. Crossley, ed., Lecture Notes in 
Mathematics, Springer, 1975. The "reminiscences by logicians" 
on pp. l-62 of this volume are also of great interest as oral 
history. 
c. Quotation opposite the Frontispiece of Weyl [C32]; see 
also ibid., vol. iv, p. 279. 
